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EIGHTH AMENDMENT CHALLENGES 
AFTER BAZE v. REES: LETHAL INJECTION,  
CIVIL RIGHTS LAWSUITS, AND  
THE DEATH PENALTY 
Harvey Gee* 
Abstract: In Baze v. Rees, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitu-
tionality of Kentucky’s lethal injection protocol, which utilizes a three-
drug combination to execute death row inmates. To challenge a lethal in-
jection protocol in the future, the Court stated that an inmate would have 
to make a showing that the protocol in question presents a “substantial 
risk of serious harm” or an “objectively intolerable risk of harm.” In addi-
tion, the inmate would have to show the existence of a feasible alternative 
that can be readily implemented and would “significantly reduce a sub-
stantial risk of severe pain.” The standard set forth in Baze makes it diffi-
cult for inmates to challenge lethal injection protocols. This Article dis-
cusses the implications of Baze in the lower courts and examines the use 
of state administrative procedure acts as an alternative litigation strategy. 
Introduction 
 Even after the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality 
of lethal injection in Baze v. Rees, death row inmates continue to bring 
forth litigation.1 In Baze, the Court held that a prisoner cannot success-
fully challenge a method of execution merely by showing that it may 
result in pain— “either by accident or as an inescapable consequence 
of death” —or that a slightly safer alternative is available.2 Rather, un-
der an Eighth Amendment analysis, it is necessary to show a “‘substan-
tial risk of serious harm’” or an “‘objectively intolerable risk of harm.’”3 
                                                                                                                      
* Attorney, Office of the Federal Public Defender (Capital Habeas Unit), Western Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania. Former Deputy Public Defender, Colorado. LL.M., The George 
Washington University Law School; J.D., St. Mary’s University School of Law; B.A., Sonoma 
State University. The author would like to thank Melanie Riccobene Jarboe, Jonah Temple, 
Abigail Morrison, and the editorial staff at the Boston College Third World Law Journal for 
their comments, editorial suggestions, and hard work. The views expressed herein are not 
necessarily attributed to any past, present, or future employers. 
1 See Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 41 (2008); Justin F. Marceau, Lifting the Haze of Baze: Le-
thal Injection, the Eighth Amendment, and Plurality Opinions, 41 Ariz. St. L.J. 159, 209 (2009). 
2 Baze, 553 U.S. at 50–51. 
3 Id. at 50 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842, 846 & n.9 (1994)). 
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For example, this can be satisfied by showing a “‘series of abortive at-
tempts at electrocution.’”4 Despite this ruling from the Supreme Court, 
the issue of lethal injection is far from being resolved. Instead, the 
Court’s ruling in Baze has had a mixed effect, with lower court judges 
left to determine how Baze affects their state’s protocol.5 
 Baze was not the best case for bringing a challenge against lethal 
injection because the challenged Kentucky procedure was somewhat 
less problematic than those of other states.6 Nevertheless, the decision 
has served to compel states, which may have had problems in the past 
with their procedures, to make corrections to fall in line with the Ken-
tucky approach.7 Consequently, this allows states to better defend 
against focused lawsuits by making it appear as if they are making good 
faith efforts to improve standards and procedure. Moreover, litigation 
in the wake of Baze continues to highlight problems that plague the 
lethal injection process, “including the mixing of the drugs; the setting 
of the IV lines; the administration of the drugs; and the monitoring of 
their effectiveness.”8 
 As a general matter, though establishing an Eighth Amendment 
violation is still possible after Baze, in reality, it is very difficult to do so. 
To satisfy the standard established by the Court in Baze, a plaintiff must 
show the existence of a feasible alternative that can be readily imple-
mented and would “significantly reduce a substantial risk of severe 
pain.”9 Efforts to clear the Baze hurdle are especially difficult because 
of the significant deference that courts pay to the decisions of state cor-
rections officials.10 As Alison Nathan warns, “Given the sad history of 
                                                                                                                      
4 Id. (quoting Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 471 (1947) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring)). 
5 See Marceau, supra note 1, at 160. 
6 See, e.g., Ty Alper, What Do Lawyers Know About Lethal Injection?, 1 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 
(Online), 5–6 (Mar. 3, 2008), http://hlpronline.com/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/ 
2009/12/Alper.pdf (describing major problems with lethal injection procedures in Tennes-
see and California); Seema Shah, How Lethal Injection Reform Constitutes Impermissible Research 
on Prisoners, 45 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1101, 1106–08 (2008) (highlighting problems in Texas, 
Ohio, Florida, and California). Thirty-five states use lethal injection as a method of execu-
tion. Alison J. Nathan, Please Ignore the Pain: History Shows Heedless Rush to Adopt Lethal Injection, 
Legal Times, Jan. 7, 2008, at 36. 
7 See, e.g., Marceau, supra note 1, at 210 n.252 (noting Arizona’s willingness to reexam-
ine lethal injection procedures after Baze). 
8 See Ty Alper, Anesthetizing the Public Conscience: Lethal Injection and Animal Euthanasia, 
35 Fordham Urb. L.J. 817, 820 (2008). 
9 See Baze, 553 U.S. at 52. 
10 See Nathan, supra note 6; see also Baze, 553 U.S. at 52. 
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lethal injection, judicial deference to the procedural and administrative 
decisions of state corrections officials is unwarranted.”11 
 This Article explores the implications of the Baze decision and ex-
amines the ongoing lethal injection litigation since Baze. Part I briefly 
summarizes the Supreme Court’s death penalty jurisprudence and ex-
amines the Baze decision. Part II explains why the Supreme Court rul-
ing in Baze makes it difficult, if not impossible, for inmates to wage suc-
cessful lethal injection challenges. It also examines the use of civil 
rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Part III discusses the use of state 
administrative procedures acts as an alternative litigation approach. In 
particular, Part III analyzes litigation stemming from a state’s failure to 
make its execution protocol available for public review. Finally, Part IV 
reflects upon the teachings of Baze and the post-Baze litigation. 
I. Capital Punishment and the U.S. Supreme Court 
A. Supreme Court Death Penalty Jurisprudence 
 The constitutionality of capital punishment was first addressed by 
the Court in the 1970s with the fractured decisions of Furman v. Georgia 
and Gregg v. Georgia.12 In 1972, the Court examined the question of ra-
cism in capital sentencing in Furman, ruling that the then-current laws 
were arbitrary and capricious.13 The Furman majority, however, did not 
determine that the death penalty in general was racially biased.14 
 Four years later, in Gregg, the Court upheld various state death 
penalty laws that included the bifurcation of trials into guilt and penalty 
phases, the application of aggravating and mitigating factors to deter-
mine just punishment, and the use of other factors permitting jury 
guidelines, jury discretion, and appellate review of death sentences.15 
                                                                                                                      
11 See Nathan, supra note 6. 
12 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 158 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 240 
(1972); Stephen F. Smith, The Supreme Court and the Politics of Death, 94 Va. L. Rev. 283, 381 
(2008) (arguing that the Court politicized the death penalty by constitutionalizing capital 
punishment); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Opening a Window or Building a Wall? 
The Effect of Eighth Amendment Death Penalty Law and Advocacy on Criminal Justice More Broadly, 
11 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 155, 167 (2008) (“The 1976 decisions stabilized the American death 
penalty, and executions resumed shortly thereafter.”). At the time, 120 out of 3300 death 
row inmates were executed. See David M. Oshinsky, Capital Punishment on Trial: 
Furman v. Georgia and the Death Penalty in Modern America 39 (2010). 
13 See Furman, 408 U.S. at 242; Helen Shin, Note, Is the Death of the Death Penalty Near? 
The Impact of Atkins and Roper on the Future of Capital Punishment for Mentally Ill Defendants, 
76 Fordham L. Rev. 465, 473 (2007). 
14 See Oshinsky, supra note 12, at 54. 
15 See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195–202. 
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The Court held that these practices were constitutional under Eighth 
Amendment standards.16 
 Other legal challenges came before the Court that clarified the 
scope of the Eighth Amendment in the death penalty context. For in-
stance, one year following Gregg, the Court, in Coker v. Georgia, ruled 
that the death penalty was a disproportionate punishment for the of-
fense of rape.17 In the next decade, the Court followed this ruling in 
Ford v. Wainwright, in which it held that a state may not execute a person 
who is insane at the time of execution.18 More recently, in 2002, the 
Court reversed a previous ruling by holding in Atkins v. Virginia that 
imposing a death sentence on mentally retarded individuals violated 
the “‘evolving standards of decency’” embodied in the Eighth Amend-
ment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.19 Irrespective of the 
need to hold mentally retarded persons criminally responsible, the 
Court determined that “[b]ecause of their disabilities in areas of rea-
soning, judgment, and control of their impulses, . . . they do not act 
with the level of moral culpability that characterizes the most serious 
adult criminal conduct.”20 
 Later, in Roper v. Simmons, the Court held that executing juveniles 
violated the Eighth Amendment.21 The Court noted that this frame-
work, like that used in Atkins, required looking to “‘the evolving stan-
dards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.’”22 The 
Court held that juveniles should be immune from execution because of 
the inherent differences between juveniles and adults, including a 
“‘lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility.’”23 
The Court also reasoned that juveniles are susceptible to peer pressure 
and that a juvenile’s character is “not as well formed as that of an 
adult,” thereby rendering juveniles less culpable than the worst offend-
ers that the death penalty is intended to target.24 
 During the same term that Baze was decided, in Kennedy v. Louisiana, 
the Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the death penalty 
for the rape of a child where the crime was not intended to cause and 
                                                                                                                      
16 Id. 
17 See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 599 (1977). 
18 See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 401 (1986). 
19 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 
100–01 (1958)) (abrogating Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989)). 
20 Id. at 306. 
21 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578–79 (2005). 
22 Id. at 561 (quoting Trop, 356 U.S. at 100–01). 
23 See id. at 569 (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)). 
24 See id. at 569–70. 
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did not result in the victim’s death.25 The Court referred to its past deci-
sions in finding that capital punishment must “be limited to those of-
fenders who commit ‘a narrow category of the most serious crimes’ and 
whose extreme culpability makes them ‘the most deserving of execu-
tion.’”26 The Kennedy Court cited to Baze in dicta when it discussed the 
difficult tensions between general legal principles and case facts.27 
B. Race and the Death Penalty 
 In a historical context, punishment by death can be perceived as a 
vestige of the race-based lynchings and executions that were imposed 
upon young African American males accused of assaults on whites.28 Yet, 
the Supreme Court has held that evidence of a statistical disparity in the 
execution of African Americans is an unconvincing argument against 
the death penalty.29 In 1987, the Court in McCleskey v. Kemp ruled that 
statistical evidence showing the racially disproportionate impact of 
Georgia’s death penalty law was insufficient to overturn a defendant’s 
death sentence.30 Rather, the Court held that regardless of any historical 
record of a disproportionate impact of death sentences imposed upon 
African Americans, such evidence is irrelevant absent a showing of in-
tentional discrimination in the sentencing of the particular defendant.31 
 Warren McCleskey was convicted of killing a police officer and, 
following the jury’s recommendation, a Georgia superior court sen-
tenced him to death.32 McCleskey appealed the sentence to the federal 
court and argued that Georgia’s legal procedures were administered in 
a racially discriminatory manner because the death penalty was im-
posed more often when there was a white victim.33 McCleskey’s argu-
ment was based on David Baldus’s study focusing on death penalty data 
in Georgia.34 The Baldus study concluded that a defendant convicted 
                                                                                                                      
25 See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 413 (2008). 
26 Id. at 420 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 568). 
27 Id. at 436–37. Baze reappeared in Justice Thomas’s dissent in Graham v. Florida. 130 
S. Ct. 2011, 2044 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting). In Graham, the Court held that the 
Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of life sentences without parole on juvenile 
offenders in non-homicide cases. Id. at 2034 (majority opinion). Justice Thomas referred 
to Baze in his discussion of the original meaning of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 2044 
(Thomas, J., dissenting). 
28 See Oshinsky, supra note 12, at 10. 
29 See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 287–88 (1987). 
30 See id. at 297. 
31 See id. at 298 n.20. 
32 See id. at 283–85. 
33 See id. at 286. 
34 See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 286. 
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of murdering a white victim was 4.3 times more likely to receive the 
death penalty than a defendant convicted of murdering a black vic-
tim.35 Nevertheless, Justice Powell, writing for the majority, concluded 
that race was not an issue in McCleskey’s conviction.36 Applying a co-
lorblind analysis, he explained that race was not a proven factor in the 
sentencing because the statistical evidence could not establish the req-
uisite racial animus of the prosecutor, jurors, or judge in McCleskey’s 
case.37 Justice Powell reasoned that the Eighth Amendment was not 
violated because, though there may have been a race-based discrepancy 
in sentencing, it was not constitutionally significant.38 In Justice Pow-
ell’s view, McCleskey’s charge of racial bias could open the floodgates to 
endless litigation that relied on statistical studies of all sorts.39 He there-
fore concluded that the Constitution did not require a state to pursue 
every trivial factor related to bias in capital sentencing.40 
 In contrast, Justice Brennan urged in dissent that the racial history 
of the death penalty must be considered.41 He argued that the Baldus 
study demonstrated the lingering effects of Georgia’s dual system of 
crime and punishment on death penalty sentencing.42 Brennan con-
tended that unconscious racism, coupled with statistical evidence, was 
sufficient to demonstrate racial disparity in the application of Georgia’s 
death penalty statute.43 He explained, 
The statistical evidence in this case thus relentlessly docu-
ments the risk that McCleskey’s sentence was influenced by 
racial considerations. . . . Georgia’s legacy of a race-conscious 
criminal justice system, as well as this Court’s own recognition 
of the persistent danger that racial attitudes may affect crimi-
nal proceedings, indicates that McCleskey’s claim is not a fan-
ciful product of mere statistical artifice.44 
                                                                                                                      
35 Id. at 287. 
36 Id. at 313. 
37 Id. at 297, 308. 
38 See id. at 308. 
39 See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 308–09. 
40 See, e.g., Sheri Lynn Johnson, Unconscious Racism and the Criminal Law, 73 Cornell L. 
Rev. 1016, 1017–18 (1988); Charles Lawrence III, Unconscious Racism Revisited: Reflections on 
the Impact and Origins of “The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection,” 40 Conn. L. Rev. 931, 953 
(2008). 
41 See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 328–29 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
42 See id. at 322, 328–29. 
43 See id. at 332–35. 
44 Id. at 328–29. 
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Justices Blackmun and Stevens also dissented and respectively argued 
that the race of a defendant was determinative in his treatment by 
Georgia’s capital sentencing system and that Georgia’s racial history 
deserved consideration.45 
 The Court’s decision in McCleskey led to a great deal of criticism 
from legal scholars.46 For example, Professor Stephen Carter argued 
that McCleskey was written in a way that skirted a more fundamental is-
sue—that the entire criminal justice system is racially biased.47 Profes-
sor Carter explained: 
[T]he majority wrote in a way that made it possible to evade a 
more fundamental difficulty raised by the Baldus study—that 
racialism might be responsible not only for the disproportion-
ate execution of murderers who happens to be black, but for in-
adequate protection of murder victims who happen to be 
black.48 
                                                                                                                      
45 See id. at 345–47 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 366–67 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
46 See, e.g., Paul Butler, By Any Means Necessary: Using Violence and Subversion to Change Un-
just Law, 50 UCLA L. Rev. 721, 733 (2003) (“McCleskey v. Kemp was received by many racial 
critics with the same revulsion as the infamous decisions of Dred Scott v. Sandford and Plessy v. 
Ferguson.”). Professor Randall Kennedy characterized the ruling as legitimizing “racially selec-
tive leniency in charging and sentencing.” See Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, 
Capital Punishment, and the Supreme Court, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1388, 1440 (1988). 
47 See Stephen L. Carter, When Victims Happen to Be Black, 97 Yale L.J. 420, 441 (1988). 
48 Id. at 443. Professor Michelle Alexander argues: 
[T]he McCleskey decision was not really about the death penalty at all; rather, 
the Court’s opinion was driven by a desire to immunize the entire criminal 
justice system from claims of racial bias. The best evidence in support of this 
view can be found at the end of the majority opinion where the Court states 
that discretion plays a necessary role in the implementation of the criminal 
justice system, and that discrimination is an inevitable by-product of discre-
tion. Race discrimination, the Court seemed to suggest, was something that 
simply must be tolerated in the criminal justice system, provided no one ad-
mits to racial bias. 
Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Color-
blindness 108 (2010); see also David C. Baldus et al., Race and Proportionality Since 
McCleskey v. Kemp (1987): Different Actors with Mixed Strategies of Denial and Avoidance, 39 
Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 143, 148 (2007) (“[T]he Supreme Court in McCleskey v. Kemp 
was unwilling to address the complicated political and remedial issues that race claims 
present . . . .”); Erwin Chemerinsky, Eliminating Discrimination in Administering the Death 
Penalty: The Need for the Racial Justice Act, 35 Santa Clara L. Rev. 519, 529 (1995) (“After 
McCleskey, it will be extremely difficult to successfully challenge a death sentence on equal 
protection grounds. Even though a majority of the Justices on the Supreme Court have 
recognized that racism seriously infects the capital process, current law simply fails to pro-
vide any remedy.”). 
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 In another critique of McCleskey, Professor Sheri Lynn Johnson 
criticized the shortcomings of traditional equal protection analysis, 
which requires purposeful discriminatory intent.49 Professor Johnson 
suggests that data showing “higher conviction rates of other-race de-
fendants; the race-of-victim effect in capital sentencing [and] the over-
whelming propensity of prosecutors to strike black jurors from cases 
with black defendants” together with “verified indicia of unconscious 
racism” such as racial insults, avoidance of racial minorities, and the 
application of defense mechanisms, should be sufficient to show racial 
discrimination.50 According to Professor Johnson, such a methodology 
would not require a complete abandonment of current doctrine, but 
merely modest incremental changes.51 
 Some scholars go even further and offer ambitious claims beyond 
the realm of capital punishment, focusing instead on the relationship 
between race and the criminal justice system in this country.52 For ex-
ample, Professor Michelle Alexander in her book, The New Jim Crow: 
Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness, argues that the current 
criminal justice system is a racial caste system.53 She contends that black 
men are targeted for incarceration through tough sentencing laws and 
racist police practices.54 The end result, Professor Alexander claims, is a 
new Jim Crow era, creating social controls that disenfranchise African 
American felons who simultaneously face discrimination in employ-
ment, housing, education, voting, and jury service.55 Other academics 
                                                                                                                      
49 See Johnson, supra note 40, at 1019. 
50 See id. at 1032–34 (footnotes omitted). 
51 Id. at 1032. Professor Scott Howe also advocates the consideration of unconscious 
racial discrimination in developing new ways to analyze capital punishment but, unlike 
Professor Johnson, he emphasizes an Eighth Amendment-centered approach. See Scott W. 
Howe, The Futile Quest for Racial Neutrality in Capital Selection and the Eighth Amendment Argu-
ment for Abolition Based on Unconscious Racial Discrimination, 45 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 2083, 
2145–49 (2004). 
52 See, e.g., David V. Baker, Purposeful Discrimination in Capital Sentencing, 5 J.L. & Soc. 
Challenges 189, 194–95 (2003); Maxine Goodman, A Death Penalty Wake-Up Call: Reducing 
the Risk of Racial Discrimination in Capital Punishment, 12 Berkeley J. Crim. L. 29, 32–33 
(2007); Rita K. Lomio, Working Against the Past: The Function of American History of Race Rela-
tions and Capital Punishment in Supreme Court Opinions, 9 J.L. Soc’y 163, 168–71 (2008); 
Michael Mears, The Georgia Death Penalty: A Need for Racial Justice, 1 J. Marshall L.J. 71, 79–
83 (2008); Michael Millemann & Gary W. Christopher, Preferring White Lives: The Racial 
Administration of the Death Penalty in Maryland, 5 U. Md. L.J. Race, Religion, Gender & 
Class 1, 1–3 (2005). But see Paul Cassell, In Defense of the Death Penalty, Prosecutor, 
Oct./Nov./Dec. 2008, at 10, 19–22. 
53 Alexander, supra note 48, at 11–12. 
54 Id. at 14–17. 
55 Id. at 185–89. 
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forcefully argue that capital punishment’s roots may be traced to slav-
ery, Jim Crow, and the preservation of white supremacy.56 Against this 
backdrop, Professor Charles Ogletree asserts, “The belief that ‘justice is 
blind’ will yield to the reality that, in fact, blind justice is injustice.’ The 
strongly-held view that in order to become colorblind we must first be 
color-conscious must be adopted by the criminal justice system, and 
reflected in our national crime policy.”57 Given the stark racial disparity 
of death penalty statistics, it is difficult to reconcile the ideals of a co-
lorblind constitution and formal equality with the actual disparate im-
pact on racial minorities in death penalty cases.58 
 Scholars have reasonably concluded that the death penalty has 
been used in a racially biased manner.59 Indeed, there are numerous 
empirical studies that support the assertion of racial bias in death pen-
alty cases.60 Recent research supports the original findings of the 
                                                                                                                      
 
56 See, e.g., id. at 20–22; Gabriel J. Chin, Jim Crow’s Long Goodbye, 21 Const. Comment. 
107, 121–22 (2004) (explaining that some discriminatory vestiges of Jim Crow could be 
“used to justify incarceration or enhanced punishment today”); Phyllis Goldfarb, Pedagogy 
of the Suppressed: A Class on Race and the Death Penalty, 31 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 547, 
551–53 (2007); Dorothy E. Roberts, Constructing a Criminal Justice System Free of Racial Bias: 
An Abolitionist Framework, 39 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 261, 272 (2007). 
57 See Charles J. Ogletree, Commentary, The Significance of Race in Federal Sentencing, 6 
Fed. Sent’g Rep. 229, 231 (1994) (quoting Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The Death of Discretion? 
Reflections on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1938, 1959–60 (1988)) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted). 
58 See Anthony V. Alfieri, Retrying Race, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 1141, 1143–45 (2003) (ex-
plaining positive aspects of renewed prosecution of white-on-black racial violence but not-
ing its inadequacies without candid investigation of racist prosecutorial discretion); Mi-
chael K. Brown, The Death Penalty and the Politics of Racial Resentment in the Post Civil Rights 
Era, 58 DePaul L. Rev. 645, 653 (2009) (“The post civil rights racial order is based on for-
mal equality before the law and a public ideology of colorblindness.”); Scott W. Howe, 
Race, Death and Disproportionality, 37 N. Ky. L. Rev. 213, 240–41 (2010) (noting the contin-
ued influence of racial bias in capital punishment). 
59 See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Opening Remarks: Race and the Death Penalty Before and Af-
ter McCleskey, 39 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 34, 35 (2007); David C. Baldus et al., Evidence 
of Racial Discrimination in the Use of the Death Penalty: A Story from Southwest Arkansas (1990–
2005) with Special Reference to the Case of Death Row Inmate Frank Williams, Jr., 76 Tenn. L. Rev. 
555, 574–75 (2009); Katherine Barnes et al., Place Matters (Most): An Empirical Study of Prose-
cutorial Decision-Making in Death-Eligible Cases, 51 Ariz. L. Rev. 305, 339 (2009); Jeffrey J. 
Pokorak, Probing the Capital Prosecutor’s Perspective: Race of the Discretionary Actors, 83 Cornell 
L. Rev. 1811, 1814–18 (1998); Isaac Unah, Choosing Those Who Will Die: The Effect of Race, 
Gender, and Law in Prosecutorial Decision to Seek the Death Penalty in Durham County, North Caro-
lina, 15 Mich. J. Race & L. 135, 140–41 (2009). 
60 See, e.g., Staff of Subcomm. on Civil & Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 103d Cong., Racial Disparities in Federal Death Penalty Prose-
cutions 1988–94, reprinted in 140 Cong. Rec. S9588, 9588 (May 6, 1994) (“Race continues 
to plague the application of the death penalty in the United States. On the state level, ra-
cial disparities are most obvious in the predominant selection of cases involving white vic-
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Baldus study that the race of the victim also matters in the determina-
tion of a death sentence.61 For instance, a study on the death penalty in 
North Carolina revealed that a defendant who is suspected of killing a 
white victim is three times more likely to receive the death penalty than 
if the victim is black.62 Moreover, there is ample evidence demonstrat-
ing that race plays a central role in the prosecution of capital cases, 
which are commonly tried by white prosecutors.63 In response to these 
criticisms, Kentucky and North Carolina have implemented Racial Jus-
tice Acts that allow defendants to use statistics and other evidence in 
proving racial bias in the application of death penalty laws; there have 
been attempts made to pass similar acts in Congress and Georgia.64 
 Finally, it is important to note that the discussion over race and the 
death penalty cannot be neatly divided into categories of black and 
                                                                                                                      
tims. On the federal level, cases selected have almost exclusively involved minority defen-
dants.”); Angela J. Davis, Arbitrary Justice: The Power of the American Prosecutor 
186–89 (2007); Hugo Adam Bedau, Racism, Wrongful Convictions, and the Death Penalty, 76 
Tenn. L. Rev. 615, 623 (2009); Richard C. Dieter, The Death Penalty in Black and White: Who 
Lives, Who Dies, Who Decides, Death Penalty Info. Center ( June 1998), http://www.death 
penaltyinfo.org/death-penalty-black-and-white-who-lives-who-dies-who-decides (document-
ing racism in the administration of the death penalty). 
61 See David C. Baldus, Keynote Address: The Death Penalty Dialogue Between Law and Social 
Science, 70 Ind. L.J. 1033, 1039–40 (1995); David C. Baldus & George Woodworth, Race 
Discrimination in the Administration of the Death Penalty: An Overview of the Empirical Evidence 
with Special Emphasis on the Post-1990 Research, 39 Crim. L. Bull. 194, 214–15 (2003); 
Stephen B. Bright, Discrimination, Death and Denial: The Tolerance of Racial Discrimination in 
Infliction of the Death Penalty, 35 Santa Clara L. Rev. 433, 434 (1995); Chemerinsky, supra 
note 48, at 521; Scott Phillips, Racial Disparities in the Capital of Capital Punishment, 45 Hous. 
L. Rev. 807, 811–12 (2008) (asserting that the death penalty is more likely to be imposed 
on black defendants than white defendants); see, e.g., Ronald J. Tabak, Capital Punishment, 
in The State of Criminal Justice 213, 219 (Myrna S. Raeder ed., 2010). 
62 See Michael Hewlett, Disparity Seen in Death Penalty, Winston-Salem J., July 23, 2010, 
at A1. 
63 See Bright, supra note 61, at 436, 443. 
64 N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 15A-2010 to -2012 (2009) (“No person shall be subject to or 
given a sentence of death or shall be executed pursuant to any judgment that was sought 
or obtained on the basis of race.”); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 532.300-.309 (LexisNexis 2008) 
(“No person shall be subject to or given a sentence of death that was sought on the basis of 
race.”); see Seth Kotch & Robert P. Mosteller, The Racial Justice Act and the Long Struggle with 
Race and the Death Penalty in North Carolina, 88 N.C. L. Rev. 2031, 2115 n.377 (2010); Gen-
naro F. Vito, The Racial Justice Act in Kentucky, 37 N. Ky. L. Rev. 273, 277 (2010); see also 
Bright, supra note 61, at 434; Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Legislating Racial Fairness in Criminal 
Justice, 39 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 233, 238–41, 244 n.55 (2007); Michael Mears, The 
Georgia Death Penalty: A Need for Racial Justice, 1 J. Marshall L.J. 71, 73–76 (2008). Pennsyl-
vania is in the early stages of attempting to pass a Racial Justice Act due to concerns over 
racial bias in sentencing in capital punishment cases. See Ashley Mannings, Bill Takes Aim at 
Racial Bias on Death Row: Panel Finds Skewed Sentencing in Pa. Capital Cases, Pittsburgh 
Post-Gazette, Aug. 16, 2010, at B1. 
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white.65 Although rarely discussed, as a historical matter, the first per-
son in the United States executed in a gas chamber was an Asian de-
fendant.66 In 1923, Gee Jon, a Chinese gang member, was executed by 
lethal gas at Nevada State Prison.67 Currently, there are approximately 
forty Asian inmates on death row in the United States, including the 
infamous Charles Ng, a former U.S. Marine, who was convicted of 
eleven murders and suspected of being involved in fourteen others.68 
More recently, Thavirak Sam was convicted of three counts of first-
degree murder and received three consecutive death sentences for the 
killing of his mother-in-law, brother-in-law, and niece.69 During his post-
conviction appeal proceedings, Sam was found to be incompetent to 
proceed.70 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, however, reversed the 
lower court’s determination and held that Sam’s best interests justified 
the involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication.71 
C. Lethal Injection Protocols 
 In 1977, Oklahoma created the first lethal injection protocol; soon 
thereafter many states followed Oklahoma’s lead with their own three-
drug lethal injection protocol.72 As Alison Nathan points out, one sig-
nificant issue with these state protocols is the manner in which states 
have adopted an unnecessary paralytic drug as part of the protocol.73 
She explains, 
                                                                                                                      
65 See, e.g., State v. Gee Jon, 211 P. 676, 677 (Nev. 1923) (featuring an Asian defendant). 
66 See id. at 682. 
67 Id. 
68 See Bill Enfield, Killer-Torturer of 11 on State’s Death Row, Sacramento Bee (Dec. 10, 
2009, 9:22 AM), http://blogs.sacbee.com/crime/archives/2009/12/ask-sacto911-ki-2.html; 
Deborah Fins, Death Row U.S.A., Crim. Just. Project of the NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. 
Fund, Inc., 44 (Winter 2010), http://naacpldf.org/files/publications/DRUSA_Winter_2010. 
pdf; Jeff Jardine, Accused Shouldn’t Expect Better Odds if Trial Moves, Modesto Bee, Oct. 18, 
2009, at B1; Serial Killer Wants to Make Friends, Lancashire Evening Post (Feb. 24, 2009), 
http://www.lep.co.uk/news/serial_killer_wants_to_make_friends_1_88169. 
69 Commonwealth v. Sam, 952 A.2d 565, 568 (Pa. 2008). 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 588. 
72 Shah, supra note 6, at 1103. In all states that follow the three-drug protocol, a se-
quence of three powerful drugs is administered. Id. at 1105. The first drug is sodium thio-
pental, which is intended to anesthetize the inmate. Id. The second drug is pancuronium 
bromide, a neuromuscular blocking agent that causes paralysis. Id. The final injection is of 
potassium chloride, which causes death by inducing cardiac arrest. Id. 
73 Alison J. Nathan & Douglas A. Berman, Debate, Baze-d and Confused: What’s the Deal 
with Lethal Injection?, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. PENNumbra 312, 316–17 (2008), http://www. 
pennumbra.com/debates/index.php?date=24096. 
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The nature of this drug is to mask the realities of the execu-
tion from meaningful public scrutiny. A paralyzed inmate suf-
fering pain during the execution will be physically unable to 
express his suffering. As a result, witnesses, including mem-
bers of the media . . . see only a sanitized version. Unaware of 
the painful suffering endured by inmates, the public has as-
sumed wrongly that states always execute inmates in a hu-
mane and painless manner.74 
 Problems occur with the application of lethal injection protocols 
in several states.75 For example, there have been botched attempts to 
find suitable veins, with some administrations lasting as long as two 
hours.76 Additionally, execution team members have administered le-
thal injection drugs without any knowledge of their purpose or risks.77 
As Professor Deborah Denno states, “‘Lethal injection, which has the 
veneer of medical acceptability, has far greater risks of cruelty [than 
death by a firing squad] to a condemned person.’”78 
D. The Supreme Court Decision in Baze v. Rees 
 In Baze, a Kentucky death row inmate claimed that the state’s 
three-drug lethal injection method was cruel and unusual punishment 
under the Eighth Amendment.79 He argued that the state’s protocol 
created an unacceptable risk of significant pain.80 In denying the in-
mate’s claim, the Justices expressed conflicting rationales in a series of 
divergent opinions. 
 Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the plurality, refused to apply an 
“unnecessary risk of pain” standard of review, holding that such a stan-
dard would “transform courts into boards of inquiry,” creating endless 
litigation.81 Instead, Chief Justice Roberts explained that an execution 
method constitutes cruel and unusual punishment only if it presents a 
“‘substantial risk of serious harm’” or an “‘objectively intolerable risk of 
                                                                                                                      
74 Id. at 316. 
75 See Alper, supra note 6, at 5–6; Shah, supra note 6, at 1106–08. 
76 Shah, supra note 6, at 1106–07; see also Richard Klein, Supreme Court Criminal Law Juris-
prudence—October 2008 Term, 26 Touro L. Rev. 545, 571 (2010) (noting an instance where an 
execution needed to be rescheduled after eighteen failed attempts to inject the drugs). 
77 See Morales v. Tilton, 465 F. Supp. 2d 972, 979 (N.D. Cal. 2006). 
78 Jennifer Dobner, Firing Squad Is More Humane, Some Experts Say, Detroit Free Press, 
June 17, 2010, at A14 (analyzing lethal injection procedures and their risks). 
79 Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 41 (2008). 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 51. 
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harm.’”82 As a result, a state’s refusal to implement alternative execu-
tion procedures will not violate the Eighth Amendment unless the al-
ternative procedure is “feasible, readily implemented, and in fact sig-
nificantly reduce[s] a substantial risk of severe pain.”83 
 The Court held that the risk of improper administration of the ini-
tial drug did not render the three-drug protocol cruel and unusual.84 
Chief Justice Roberts further explained that the state’s failure to adopt 
proposed, allegedly more humane alternatives to the three-drug proto-
col did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.85 Paying defer-
ence to the states, Chief Justice Roberts acknowledged that the “Court 
has never invalidated a State’s chosen procedure for carrying out a sen-
tence of death as the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment.”86 
 The Court was not persuaded by the “petitioners[’] claim that 
there is a significant risk that the procedures will not be properly fol-
lowed—in particular, that the sodium thiopental will not be properly 
administered to achieve its intended effect—resulting in severe pain 
when the other chemicals are administered.”87 Likewise, the Court did 
not accept the argument that Kentucky could switch from a three-drug 
protocol to a single-drug protocol.88 Rather, Chief Justice Roberts rea-
soned that “a condemned prisoner cannot successfully challenge a 
State’s method of execution merely by showing a slightly or marginally 
safer alternative.”89 Chief Justice Roberts declared that Kentucky can-
not be viewed as wantonly inflicting pain under the Eighth Amendment 
simply because it uses an injection method for which it simultaneously 
adopts safeguards.90 
 Justices Stevens, Scalia, Thomas, and Breyer each filed an opinion 
concurring in the judgment.91 In particular, Justice Thomas argued that 
                                                                                                                      
 
82 Id. at 50 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842, 846 & n.9 (1994)). 
83 Id. at 52. 
84 Baze, 553 U.S. at 56. 
85 Id. 
86 See id. at 48. 
87 See id. at 49. 
88 See id. at 56–57. 
89 Baze, 553 U.S. at 51. 
90 See id. at 62. 
91 Id. at 71 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 87 (Scalia, J., concurring in 
the judgment); id. at 94 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 107 (Breyer, J., 
concurring in the judgment). Justice Stevens expressed concern that the drug used could 
”mask[] any outward sign of distress” despite an inmate’s “excruciating pain before death 
occurs.” Id. at 71 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). He also declared that he be-
lieved the death penalty was unconstitutional. Id. at 86–87. Yet, constrained by precedent, 
Stevens determined that Kentucky’s method of lethal injection met the tests proposed by 
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a form of capital punishment “violates the Eighth Amendment only if it 
is deliberately designed to inflict pain . . . .”92 He concluded that Baze 
was “an easy case” and that the defendants’ challenge should fail 
“[b]ecause Kentucky’s lethal injection protocol is designed to eliminate 
pain rather than to inflict it . . . .”93 Justice Thomas also criticized the 
Court for failing to provide states with any clear guidelines moving for-
ward.94 He warned that the reasoning offered by the plurality would 
lead to litigation and burden courts because Kentucky’s lethal injection 
protocol was not intended to inflict pain.95 Thomas explained, 
[F]ar from putting an end to abusive litigation in this area, . . . 
today’s decision is sure to engender more litigation. At what 
point does a risk become “substantial”? Which alternative 
procedures are “feasible” and “readily implemented”? When is 
a reduction in risk “significant”? What penological justifica-
tions are “legitimate”? Such are the questions the lower courts 
will have to grapple with in the wake of today’s decision. 
Needless to say, we have left the States with nothing resem-
bling a bright-line rule.96 
 In contrast, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg argued in her dissent that 
it was undisputed that Kentucky’s method would cause an inmate to 
suffer excruciating pain.97 Justices Ginsburg and Stevens were both 
mindful of the potential pain felt by the inmate and thus argued that 
“Kentucky’s protocol lacks basic safeguards used by other States to con-
firm that an inmate is unconscious before injection of the second and 
third drugs.”98 Justice Ginsburg advocated a lesser standard that would 
require petitioners to demonstrate only “an untoward, readily avoidable 
risk of inflicting severe and unnecessary pain.”99 She suggested that 
three factors should be considered: the degree of risk, the magnitude 
of pain, and the availability of alternatives.100 Justice Ginsburg argued 
that if a petitioner demonstrated a high level of one factor, then the 
                                                                                                                      
both the plurality and by Justice Ginsburg in dissent, and therefore concurred in the 
judgment. Id. at 87. 
92 Id. at 94 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
93 Id. at 107. 
94 See Baze, 553 U.S. at 105 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
95 See id. at 94, 105. 
96 Id. at 105. 
97 See id. at 113 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
98 See id. at 114. 
99 Baze, 553 U.S. at 114 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
100 Id. at 116. 
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petitioner would not need to make a significant showing on the other 
factors.101 
 After Baze, establishing an Eighth Amendment violation is an up-
hill battle for those challenging lethal injection protocols.102 Challeng-
ers throughout the country are discovering that it is difficult to meet 
the Baze standard of “‘a substantial risk of serious harm.’”103 Inmates 
must now show the existence of a feasible alternative that would “sig-
nificantly reduce a substantial risk of severe pain.”104 It is possible that 
this high threshold may be too exacting and too difficult for any chal-
lenger to meet.105 At the same time, placing the burden on states to 
provide an alternative that would significantly reduce a substantial risk 
of severe pain could also be a herculean task.106 
 Ultimately, major issues concerning litigation over lethal injection 
remain open and uncertainties persist.107 Baze leaves many questions 
unresolved.108 First, it is unclear what factors are necessary to demon-
strate that a state protocol would create a risk under the Baze stan-
dard.109 Second, Baze does not indicate when such a risk is “substantial” 
or “significant”110 Finally, the question of whether a single drug proto-
col is ever appropriate is still unanswered.111 Moving forward, Baze has 
left the doors open for future lethal injection challenges.112 As Justice 
Stevens predicted, “When we granted certiorari in this case, I assumed 
                                                                                                                      
101 See id. 
102 See id. at 50–52 (plurality opinion); id. at 105 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judg-
ment). 
103 See id. at 50 (plurality opinion) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842, 846 & n.9). 
104 See Baze, 553 U.S. at 52. 
105 See id. at 105 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
106 See id. at 47–48 (plurality opinion) (holding that requiring states to adopt proce-
dures with the lowest risk would put states’ methods in perpetual doubt); id. at 67 (Alito, J., 
concurring) (noting that purported hazards and advantages are unreliable); id. at 105 
(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (highlighting the absence of a clear standard 
going forward). 
107 See id. at 105 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
108 See Marceau, supra note 1, at 210–11. 
109 See Baze, 553 U.S. at 116–17 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (outlining the differences be-
tween the plurality’s view and her view of the important factors); see also id. at 107–08 
(Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (indicating agreement with the factors Justice 
Ginsburg listed). 
110 See id. at 105 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
111 See id. at 61 (plurality opinion) (”A State with a lethal injection protocol substan-
tially similar to the protocol we uphold today would [be upheld as constitutional].”). 
112 See id. at 71 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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that our decision would bring the debate about lethal injection as a 
method of execution to a close. It now seems clear that it will not.”113 
II. The Aftershocks: Lethal Injection Litigation 
in the Lower Courts 
A. § 1983 Civil Rights Complaints Challenging Lethal Injection Procedures 
 The majority of lethal injection lawsuits after Baze have been filed 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which has historically been a means for a pris-
oner to challenge conditions of confinement.114 Unlike claims chal-
lenging the death penalty in general, claims against specific procedures 
do not require a writ of habeas corpus.115 For example, in Nelson v. 
Campbell, the Supreme Court held that an Alabama death row inmate 
could use § 1983 to challenge the rarely used “cut-down” method of 
legal injection, and that such actions were not subject to habeas cor-
pus’s more rigorous procedural gate-keeping requirements.116 Like-
wise, in Hill v. McDonough, the Court held that cases challenging a 
method of execution were generally grounded in civil rights jurispru-
dence.117 Because the complaint challenged the particular method that 
was likely to be used for execution rather than directly challenging the 
death sentence itself, the Court reasoned that the challenge could pro-
ceed as a civil rights action rather than as a habeas action.118 
                                                                                                                      
113 Id. Since retiring, Justice Stevens has become more outspoken about his opposition to 
the death penalty. See John Paul Stevens, On the Death Sentence, N.Y. Rev. Books (Dec. 23, 
2010), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2010/dec/23/death-sentence/ (review-
ing David Garland, Peculiar Institution: America’s Death Penalty in an Age of Abo-
lition (2010)). 
114 See Richard C. Dieter, Methods of Execution and Their Effect on the Use of the Death Pen-
alty in the United States, 35 Fordham Urb. L.J. 789, 800 (2008); Ellen Kreitzberg & David 
Richter, But Can It Be Fixed? A Look At Constitutional Challenges to Lethal Injection Executions, 
47 Santa Clara L. Rev. 445, 467–69 (2007). 
115 See Dieter, supra note 114, at 799–800. 
116 See Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 639, 646–47 (2004). The cut-down method of 
execution is used when an inmate has compromised veins, making traditional injection 
procedures impossible. See id. at 640–41. In such a case, prison personnel make an incision 
and catheterize a vein, through which the lethal drugs are delivered. See id. 
117 See Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 579, 583–85 (2006). 
118 See id. at 580–81; see also Beardslee v. Woodford, 395 F.3d 1064, 1068–69 (9th Cir. 
2005) (acknowledging that a § 1983 action is the proper vehicle to challenge a method of 
execution); Jackson v. United States, 638 F. Supp. 2d 514, 615 (W.D.N.C. 2009) (“A motion 
pursuant to § 2255 is not the appropriate procedural mechanism for placing this issue 
before a court.”); Emmett v. Johnson, 489 F. Supp. 2d 543, 547 (E.D. Va. 2007) (“The per-
missible scope of a constitutional challenge to execution procedures brought under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 is narrow. A civil rights action is not an appropriate vehicle to contest either 
an inmate’s sentence of death or the constitutionality of the death penalty generally.”). 
2011] Eighth Amendment Challenges After Baze v. Rees 233 
 Civil litigation under § 1983 is preferable to filing a petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus, in part because document requests and inter-
rogatories may be made as a matter of course.119 Inmates need discov-
ery to determine if there is a substantial risk of severe pain due to 
maladministration of the injection protocol.120 In litigation, the onus 
remains on inmates to educate the courts about death penalty proto-
cols because courts may not be knowledgeable about them.121 As such, 
it is important for inmates to gather as much information as possible 
about the protocol through civil rights suits.122 
B. Baze as Applied 
 In the wake of Baze, challenges to lethal injection procedures face 
major difficulties.123 Meeting the Baze legal standard requires a showing 
that a state’s lethal injection protocol poses a substantial risk of severe 
pain as written.124 Many cases highlight the undue deference that 
courts give to execution protocols.125 In general, courts tend to defer to 
states that refuse to adopt alternative methods because of a legitimate 
penological justification for adhering to the present method.126 In ad-
dition, courts misapply the Baze standard, treating the Baze decision as a 
rigid safe harbor.127 
 Indeed, the Baze decision has created a safe harbor for states.128 If 
a state’s lethal injection protocol is similar to the Kentucky protocol 
that was upheld in Baze, then it will not violate the Eighth Amend-
ment.129 For example, in Harbison v. Little, the Sixth Circuit vacated a 
district court decision holding that Tennessee’s lethal injection proto-
                                                                                                                      
119 See Nelson, 541 U.S. at 639; see also Daniel R. Oldenkamp, Note, Civil Rights in the 
Execution Chamber: Why Death Row Inmates’ Section 1983 Claims Demand Reassessment of Legiti-
mate Penological Objectives, 42 Val. U. L. Rev. 955, 961–62, 974–75 (2008). 
120 See, e.g., Harbison v. Little, 571 F.3d 531, 540–41 (6th Cir. 2009) (Clay, J., dissenting). 
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122 See id. 
123 See Eric Berger, Lethal Injection and the Problem of Constitutional Remedies, 27 Yale L. & 
Pol’y Rev. 259, 260–62 (2009). 
124 See Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 41, 52 (2008). 
125 See Berger, supra note 123, at 260–62. 
126 See id. at 262 (“Courts, in other words, are adopting a blanket deference that makes 
it more difficult for even the strongest cases to get a fair hearing.”); Oldenkamp, supra 
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127 See, e.g., Harbison, 571 F.3d at 536; Dickens v. Brewer, No. CV07-1770-PHX-NVW, 
2009 WL 1904294, at *27–28 (D. Ariz. July 1, 2009). 
128 See, e.g., Harbison, 571 F.3d at 536. 
129 See Baze, 553 U.S. at 61. 
234 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 31:217 
col violated the Eighth Amendment.130 The Sixth Circuit upheld the 
protocol, concluding that it did not create a substantial risk of severe 
pain.131 In the case itself, the petitioner argued that Tennessee’s lethal 
injection protocol “violate[d] his Eighth Amendment rights because it 
involve[d] the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.”132 Harbi-
son’s claims focused on the protocol’s failure to require a check for 
consciousness, the inadequate selection and training of personnel, the 
failure to provide for tactile monitoring of the IV lines, and the state’s 
refusal to adopt alternative procedures.133 
 The Harbison court relied heavily on Baze.134 It reasoned that Ten-
nessee’s protocol was substantially similar to the Kentucky protocol that 
was at issue in Baze and thus did not create a risk of a constitutional vio-
lation.135 The court explained, “Tennessee’s protocol must be upheld 
because Baze addressed the same risks identified by the trial court, but 
reached the conclusion that they did not rise to the level of a constitu-
tional violation.”136 The court also looked at the training of medical 
personnel and execution procedures required by the Tennessee proto-
col and determined that they were similar to those found to be ade-
quate and constitutional in Baze.137 
 In dissent, Judge Eric Lee Clay criticized the court’s heavy reliance 
on the “substantially similar” Kentucky protocol at issue in Baze.138 He 
argued that the majority’s reasoning was legally and analytically 
flawed.139 Judge Clay explained, 
The majority recasts the district court’s evidentiary findings in 
light of criteria that the [district] court never considered, pre-
suming findings under Baze that the district court never made. 
It does so in a cursory manner, with minimal attention to the 
Baze plurality’s fact-specific analysis, summarily concluding at 
                                                                                                                      
130 Harbison, 571 F.3d at 533. The court also vacated the lower court’s injunction that 
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131 Id. at 539. 
132 Id. at 534. 
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each juncture that any deficiencies in Tennessee’s execution 
protocol had already been considered but rejected in Baze.140 
Of particular concern for Judge Clay was the district court’s lack of op-
portunity to consider the evidence and to apply the Baze standard be-
cause the district court issued its opinion before the Baze ruling.141 
Judge Clay insisted that the district court should have been given the 
full opportunity to conduct extensive fact-finding to determine whether 
the state’s protocol was properly implemented.142 He argued, “It is not 
unforeseeable that a three-drug protocol that is, at first glance, similar 
to Kentucky’s protocol, could fail to meet the standard set forth in 
Baze.”143 Accordingly, Judge Clay concluded that the majority should 
have remanded the case back to the district court instead of making its 
own determination on the merits.144 
 Similarly, in Arizona, the federal district court has held that the 
state’s lethal injection protocol does not subject inmates to substantial 
risk of serious harm in violation of the Eighth Amendment.145 The 
court based its holding on the fact that the Arizona protocol was sub-
stantially similar to the lethal injection protocol approved in Baze and 
provided even more safeguards than the Kentucky protocol.146 Like-
wise, when determining the constitutionality of state protocols, the 
Fourth Circuit asks whether the execution protocol in question is “sub-
stantially similar to the protocol upheld in Baze.”147 
 Because of the difficulty that challengers face in showing that state 
protocols create a substantial risk of severe pain as written, a potential 
alternative is to demonstrate that the protocol, constitutional as written, 
would be applied in an unconstitutional manner.148 Under this ap-
proach, a challenge may be successful if there is a sufficient risk that the 
written protocol would not be followed or performed as expected.149 
                                                                                                                      
140 Harbison, 571 F.3d at 540 (Clay, J., dissenting). 
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142 See id. 
143 Id. at 540. 
144 See id. at 540–41. 
145 See Dickens, 2009 WL 1904294, at *38. 
146 See id. at *30, *38. 
147 See Emmett v. Johnson, 532 F.3d 291, 299 (4th Cir. 2008). In Emmett v. Johnson, the 
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149 See Baze, 553 U.S. at 41. 
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Again, this is a difficult showing to make.150 For instance, inmates may 
complain that there is a significant risk that physicians, nurses, or other 
medical personnel will not follow the lethal injection procedures, but 
may struggle to prove that a member of the execution team would in-
tentionally or negligently deviate from or disregard the protocol.151 
 Moreover, in this context, courts continue to use Baze as a safe har-
bor.152 For example, in Clemons v. Crawford, a group of death row in-
mates challenged Missouri’s written lethal injection protocol.153 The 
inmates claimed that the protocol violated the Eighth Amendment be-
cause of the substantial risk that the protocol could be administered im-
properly.154 The inmates based their claim on evidence of previous im-
proper preparation and administration of lethal chemicals by state 
medical personnel.155 The U.S. District Court for the Western District of 
Missouri, however, held that the inmates failed to state a viable Eighth 
Amendment claim.156 The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court de-
cision, concluding that the challengers did not allege a sufficiently sub-
stantial risk of serious harm or a sufficiently imminent danger to sup-
port an Eighth Amendment claim.157 The court repeatedly referred to 
similarities between the facts in the case and those in Baze, concluding 
that the Missouri protocol safeguarded against the risk of maladminis-
tration in ways similar to or more stringent than the Kentucky proto-
col.158 
 In general, courts require more than a showing of previous in-
stances of deviations from protocol before invalidating lethal injection 
procedures.159 For instance, in Jackson v. Danberg, the U.S. District Court 
of Delaware held that the state’s previous casualness in following lethal 
injection procedures did not by itself create a risk of inability to carry 
out revised protocol.160 The court also concluded that the risk of giving 
an insufficient dose of sodium thiopental at the first stage of the state’s 
revised protocol did not give rise to an objectively intolerable risk of 
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harm.161 Likewise, the Fifth Circuit, in Raby v. Livingston, held that the 
potential problems associated with intravenous insertions did not ren-
der Texas’s lethal injection protocol in violation of the Eighth Amend-
ment.162 The plaintiff’s argument in Raby was based “entirely on the hy-
pothetical possibilities of human error or failure to follow protocol.”163 
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s finding that “[t]hese hy-
potheticals are insufficient to remove the Texas procedure from the safe 
harbor created by Baze.”164 
 The cases that have followed Baze demonstrate that it is unlikely 
courts will find that a protocol subjects inmates to a substantial risk of 
serious harm so long as the protocol is similar to Kentucky’s.165 Indeed, 
without a showing that the execution protocol subjects inmates to a sub-
stantial risk of serious harm, plaintiffs will not succeed in their claim, 
especially if the state’s protocol provides more procedural safeguards 
than the Kentucky protocol.166 The cases suggest that an alternative 
strategy for inmates is to demonstrate that the state is not consistently 
following its own procedures or that there is a pattern of unsuccessful 
executions.167 Yet, moving forward, inmates will be hard-pressed to 
demonstrate that a state’s protocol gives rise to an objectively intolerable 
risk of harm and that there is evidence that the execution would be car-
ried out in a cruel and unusual fashion.168 
C. Extreme Deference to State Lethal Injection Protocols 
 Based on a small sampling of post-Baze § 1983 lethal injection chal-
lenge cases, it appears that the courts have given too much deference 
to state lethal injection procedures.169 There is no consensus that the 
protocols of each state guarantee that executions are free from unnec-
essary pain and suffering.170 These protocols have been the target of 
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much criticism, even though very little information is available to the 
public.171 As one academic remarked, these protocols are descriptions 
of “hypothetical rituals” that are unlike criminal laws or civil regula-
tions, given their lack of definitions for penalties for improper behavior 
and any establishment of duty and responsibly.172 Indeed, Alison Na-
than asserts that these procedures “are often exempt from state admin-
istrative law notice-and-comment requirements or have been treated as 
exempt by prison personnel.”173 As such, critical information such as 
the type of drugs to be used, dosage amounts, and other administrative 
procedures are not publicly disclosed.174 This unfortunately precludes 
the public from learning about flawed procedures, incompetent ad-
ministration, and execution errors.175 
 So little is known about the execution protocols, in part because 
some states maintain a confidential manual that details the specific le-
thal injection proceedings followed.176 For example, in Pennsylvania, 
state law requires that an inmate be injected with “a continuous intrave-
nous administration of a lethal quantity of an ultrashort-acting barbitu-
rate in combination with chemical paralytic agents approved by the de-
partment until death is pronounced by the coroner.”177 Accordingly, 
sodium thiopental, an “ultrashort-acting barbiturate,” is administered to 
anesthetize individuals being executed.178 The lethal injection statute, 
however, offers no information about the actual method of execution, 
including the drugs to be used, how the drugs are to be obtained and 
stored, and the dosage amount.179 These questions seemingly negate 
the precautions and safeguards that typically surround the use of con-
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trolled substances and devices.180 Any reliable evaluation of Pennsyl-
vania lethal injection process, therefore, depends on knowledge of how 
the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections carries out executions.181 
Yet, the Department of Corrections maintains this information in se-
crecy.182 
 Plaintiffs recently raised such concerns in Chester v. Beard.183 In this 
ongoing litigation, plaintiffs allege that there is no information available 
that explains how the quantity of sodium thiopental is determined.184 
Plaintiffs also allege that there is no information concerning the selec-
tion and training given to the paramedics, nurses, or other health care 
professionals on the lethal injection team concerning the proper ad-
ministration of the drug.185 These allegations raise valid concerns about 
the proper injection and administration of the two other drugs— pan-
curonium bromide and potassium chloride—by members of the lethal 
injection team whose qualifications, licensure, and medical training re-
main a mystery.186 Further, there is no information available concerning 
the procedures for checking consciousness, alternative procedures, or 
adequate facilities.187 
 In December 2010, Ohio became the first state to execute an in-
mate with a single drug protocol.188 Washington has also adopted a sin-
gle drug protocol.189 Florida, Kentucky, South Carolina, Texas, and Vir-
ginia are all monitoring the implementation of Ohio’s method.190 
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While some states have switched from a three-drug protocol to a single 
drug protocol, risks remain.191 One physician has cautioned that single 
drug protocols using sodium thiopental demand scrutiny.192 One major 
concern about the single drug protocol is that an inmate’s death or 
sense of pain does not immediately become apparent.193 In the ongo-
ing debate over a three-drug protocol versus a single drug protocol, it is 
unlikely that states will reach a consensus anytime in the near future. 
III. An Alternative Strategy: Challenging  
Administrative Procedures Acts 
 A plaintiff will not succeed in challenging a particular execution 
protocol without a showing that the protocol subjects inmates to a sub-
stantial risk of serious harm, especially if the state’s protocol provides 
more procedural safeguards than the Kentucky protocol upheld in 
Baze.194 Inmates will have difficulty demonstrating that the protocol 
gives rise to an objectively intolerable risk of harm or that there is evi-
dence the execution would be carried out in a cruel and unusual fash-
ion.195 The difficulty in overcoming the Baze standard calls for an alter-
native strategy to challenge lethal injections. Plaintiffs must seek creative 
ways to fight lethal injection instead of, or in addition to, direct Eighth 
Amendment claims.196 Indeed, there are indications that this is already 
happening.197 
 After Baze, plaintiffs have brought challenges to state death penalty 
protocols based on claims that the protocols violate state administrative 
procedures acts.198 These plaintiffs argued that the state protocols 
promulgated by the departments of corrections circumvented legal 
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administrative requirements.199 In some cases, information obtained 
through discovery has caused states to make changes to their proto-
cols.200 The results, however, have been mixed. 
 The Tennessee Supreme Court in Abdur’Rahman v. Bredesen found 
that the public notice and hearing requirements of the Tennessee Uni-
form Administrative Procedures Act were not applicable to the Depart-
ment of Corrections and that the lethal injection protocols concerned 
only inmates of a correctional facility as an internal matter.201 Likewise, 
in Missouri, an inmate claimed that the Department of Corrections’s 
adoption of the lethal injection protocol violated the Missouri Adminis-
trative Procedure Act.202 The Missouri Supreme Court held that the pro-
tocol was not a “rule” within the scope of the Procedure Act and there-
fore there was no notice-and-comment requirement.203 
 In other cases, challenges under administrative procedure acts 
have been successful. For example, in Evans v. State, the Maryland 
Court of Appeals held that the state’s injection protocols were within 
the scope of the state Administrative Procedure Act and thus subject to 
its notice-and-comment rulemaking requirement.204 The court deter-
mined that the Administrative Procedure Act required Maryland’s le-
thal injection protocol to be adopted as a regulation.205 It reasoned that 
the legislative intent was to allow public review and oversight and that 
the state protocols for administration as set forth in the directives were 
ineffective unless properly adopted.206 The court further concluded 
that decisions concerning the administration of execution drugs affect 
inmates, corrections personnel, witnesses who observe the execution, 
and the general public.207 
 In Morales v. Tilton, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District 
of California held that the state’s protocol, as implemented, violated the 
Eighth Amendment.208 Central to the decision was the court’s finding 
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that there were systemic flaws in the implementation of the protocol, 
which prevented execution teams from determining the consciousness 
of the inmates and resulted in the unreliable screening of execution 
team members, inconsistent record keeping, and the use of inadequate 
facilities.209 Two years later, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the 
lower court’s finding in Morales v. California Department of Corrections that 
the state’s lethal injection protocol was adopted without complying with 
the requirements of the Administrative Procedures Act.210 
 After Morales v. Tilton, and in light of renewed attention to the state 
prison system, California began building a new death chamber and re-
vising its lethal injection guidelines.211 Yet, in 2010, the proposed new 
death penalty procedures were rejected by the Office of Administrative 
Law on the basis that some of the language conflicted with current state 
law or was ambiguous, thereby further delaying the restructuring of 
California’s lethal injection procedures.212 
 Similarly, in Bowling v. Kentucky Department of Corrections (also 
known as “Baze/Bowling II”), a group of death row inmates successfully 
brought an action against the Kentucky Department of Corrections al-
leging that Kentucky’s lethal injection protocol was unenforceable be-
cause it was not properly adopted as an administrative regulation under 
the Administrative Procedure Act.213 The Kentucky Supreme Court 
held that the Department of Corrections was required to promulgate 
the state’s lethal injection protocol as an administrative regulation.214 
As such, the specific execution procedures were not confidential, but 
subject to public disclosure.215 
IV. Lessons From Baze and Subsequent Litigation 
 After Baze, the burden is on the plaintiff to show evidence of a sub-
stantial risk of serious harm and to attack procedures using information 
from past executions.216 In order to be successful, a plaintiff must estab-
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lish that a feasible alternative procedure, which is supported by existing 
medical information and new research and advances, exists.217 It is also 
beneficial for plaintiffs to obtain additional discovery, including disclo-
sure through the state’s administrative procedure act, to support an ar-
gument that the written protocol is flawed or unlikely to be followed.218 
 Additionally, as executions by lethal injection continue, litigants 
should consider crafting equal protection claims. The McCleskey deci-
sion and the subsequent legal discourse on race and the death penalty 
make it clear that racial discrimination is a central issue in death pen-
alty challenges.219 After McCleskey, a race-based challenge to execution 
by lethal injection should include studies of the racial history of the 
state and studies of conviction rates of all races in the state, as well as an 
examination of pre-trial charges and plea bargaining terms in capital 
cases and a review of jury compositions in the state.220 Given the chang-
ing demographics in this country since McCleskey and in an effort to 
move beyond the traditional black and white dichotomy of analyzing 
racial discrimination within the context of capital punishment, consid-
eration should also be given to the impact of the death penalty on 
other races, such as Asian Americans.221 
Conclusion 
 Although the rate of executions has slowed down tremendously 
since 2000, those challenging the death penalty must still overcome the 
high hurdle created by the Supreme Court in Baze.222 Even with growing 
publicity concerning wrongful convictions and the considerable litiga-
tion costs associated with capital cases, the stringent Baze standard makes 
it very difficult for inmates on death row to successfully challenge their 
sentences. Moreover, the increasingly conservative Supreme Court will 
make challenges to the death penalty even less likely to succeed.223 Nev-
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ertheless, inmates continue active litigation against the lethal injection 
process. One can hope that with a growing concern over increased and 
costly constitutional challenges, states will move toward more humane 
measures that are consistent with evolving standards of decency. 
